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O P I N I O N  
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
  
Plaintiffs husband and wife, Brian and Judikaelle Steele, appeal, among other 
things, the District Court‟s entry of summary judgment in favor of Defendant Quad 
Graphics, Inc. (“Quad”), in their action seeking compensation for injuries that Brian 
Steele allegedly suffered as a result of exposure to toluene. Quad cross-appeals, arguing 
that the District Court erred in ruling that the opinion of Plaintiffs‟ medical expert would 
be admissible. For the following reasons, we will affirm in part and reverse in part the 
District Court‟s orders, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I.
1
 
Brian Steele began working as a substitute driver for Aramark Corp. (“Aramark”) 
in July 2004. Between 2007 and 2009, he occasionally transported “solvent soaked” shop 
towels from Quad‟s facilities in West Virginia to Aramark‟s laundry facilities in New 
Jersey. He drove this route more regularly—twice a week—from April 1, 2007, until 
August 31, 2007. During the three-hour trip, the 55-gallon drums containing the shop 
towels were stored in Steele‟s delivery truck, which had open airflow between the storage 
compartment and the cabin. Plaintiffs claim that the lids on the barrels were defective, did 
not seal properly, and often required tape to keep them closed. As a result, Plaintiffs 
allege that Brian Steele was exposed to toluene vapors during this transportation. 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
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In August 2007, Brian Steele was diagnosed with Focal Segmental 
Glomerulosclerosis (“FSGS”), which developed into end-stage renal disease. He is 
currently receiving dialysis and is on the kidney-transplant waiting list.  
Plaintiffs sued Aramark
2
 and Quad in the Superior Court of New Jersey on July 
20, 2009, seeking damages for his injuries that were allegedly caused by toluene 
exposure. In relevant part, Count II of the complaint alleges that Quad “acted negligently 
in failing to employ reasonable safety measures, and/or to apply industry standard of 
safety, in protecting plaintiff from exposure to hazardous chemicals endemic to his job.” 
(Compl. at ¶ 13, No. 09-cv-04340 (D.N.J.)). Count IV states a claim for loss of 
consortium.
3
 The action was removed from the Superior Court to the District of New 
Jersey. 
On September 2, 2011, following factual and expert discovery, Quad moved for 
summary judgment and to bar Plaintiffs‟ three experts from testifying. Plaintiffs attached 
to their response the affidavit of Brian Steele, dated July 19, 2011. The allegations 
contained therein triggered a motion by Quad to strike the affidavit as a sanction for 
Plaintiffs‟ failure to supplement their disclosures and interrogatories as required by 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. 
The District Court granted Quad‟s motion to strike. It agreed with Quad that the 
affidavit contained a new and materially different allegation, namely that the drums 
contained not only “solvent soaked” shop towels, but freestanding liquid toluene as well. 
                                              
2
 The claims against Aramark were dismissed based on the District Court‟s ruling 
regarding workers‟ compensation, which is not raised in this appeal.  
3
 Counts I and III are not part of this appeal. 
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This allegation, the District Court reasoned, was significant because it would allow 
Plaintiffs to establish negligence per se by demonstrating a violation of the West Virginia 
Shop Towel Policy, which exempts the transportation of shop towels from hazardous 
waste regulations as long as no more than one drop remains in the soiled towels (the 
“One-Drop Rule”). Given the advanced stage of the litigation, the extensive expert 
discovery that had already been completed, and Plaintiffs‟ inability to explain their 
failure to amend their interrogatories, the District Court concluded that striking the 
affidavit was the “most fitting remedy” for Plaintiffs‟ delay. (App. A53).  
The District Court granted in part and denied in part Quad‟s motion to strike 
Plaintiffs‟ experts. It precluded the testimony of Dr. Bates, an industrial hygienist expert, 
because it concluded that Dr. Bates‟ methodology was scientifically unreliable and 
because his opinion was not grounded in the specific facts of the case. It also struck the 
opinion of Mr. Pina, an occupational safety expert, because his opinion was not based on 
the factual record of the case and because it bordered on a legal conclusion. It denied 
Quad‟s motion with respect to Plaintiffs‟ medical expert Dr. Weeden, however. Although 
it noted that Dr. Weeden failed to rule out hypertension as a cause of Brian Steele‟s 
FSGS, the District Court concluded that this shortcoming was a basis for attacking the 
weight of his opinion, not its admissibility.  
Finally, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Quad on 
Plaintiffs‟ theory that Quad violated the One-Drop Rule. The District Court reasoned that 
summary judgment was appropriate because Plaintiffs‟ only evidence to support that 
theory, the belated July 19, 2011 affidavit, had been stricken. However, the District Court 
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denied Quad‟s motion as to his claim for negligently exposing Brian Steele to toluene 
vapors. It concluded that Dr. Weeden‟s expert opinion was sufficient to raise a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether Steele‟s exposure to toluene caused his injuries, and 
thus denied summary judgment as to Counts II and IV.  
 Both Quad and Plaintiffs filed motions for reconsideration. Plaintiffs argued, 
among other things, that the District Court had erred in entering judgment against them as 
to their One-Drop theory because it had overlooked the significance of their previous 
interrogatory answers. The District Court rejected that argument and denied Plaintiffs‟ 
motion. But the District Court did reverse course with respect to Plaintiffs‟ claim of 
negligence. The District Court concluded that Plaintiffs were required to show evidence 
of frequent, regular, and proximate exposure to toluene in order to establish medical 
causation under New Jersey toxic-tort law. Because Plaintiffs‟ had not done so, the 
District Court granted Quad‟s motion to reconsider and entered summary judgment in its 
favor on Plaintiffs‟ claims of negligence and loss of consortium. 
This timely appeal followed. 
II. 
We begin by considering Plaintiffs‟ contention that the District Court applied the 
wrong legal standard when it granted Quad‟s motion for reconsideration and precluded 
Plaintiffs‟ negligence claim. 
Under New Jersey law, to establish a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must prove: 
(1) a duty of care; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) proximate causation; and (4) injury. 
Weinberg v. Dinger, 524 A.2d 366, 373 (N.J. 1987). It is undisputed that “[i]n a toxic-tort 
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action, in addition to product-defect causation a plaintiff must prove what is known as 
„medical causation‟—that the plaintiff‟s injuries were proximately caused by exposure to 
the defendant‟s product.” James v. Bessemer Processing Co., Inc., 714 A.2d 898, 908 
(N.J. 1998). “To prove medical causation, a plaintiff must show „that the exposure [to 
each defendant‟s product] was a substantial factor in causing or exacerbating the 
disease.‟” Id. at 908-09 (quoting Sholtis v. American Cynnamid Co., 568 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989). The dispute here centers around how a toxic-tort plaintiff 
may establish medical causation. 
The District Court concluded that in order to prove medical causation, a plaintiff 
must establish “(1) factual proof of the plaintiff‟s frequent, regular and proximate 
exposure to a defendant‟s products; and (2) medical and/or scientific proof of a nexus 
between the exposure and the plaintiff‟s condition.” Id. at 911. This test was first 
announced by the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey in Sholtis, and 
adopted by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in James. The District Court concluded that 
although the second prong of this test (hereinafter the “Sholtis test”) was satisfied by Dr. 
Weeden‟s expert medical testimony, the first prong was not because Brian Steele‟s 
exposure to toluene vapors for three-hour periods, twice a week was “not the type of 
intense exposure” required under New Jersey law. (App. A28). 
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According to Plaintiffs, it was error to apply the Sholtis test.
4
 Plaintiffs argue that 
the unique factual scenarios and attendant causation problems presented by Sholtis and 
James, are not present here. We agree. 
 Sholtis involved plaintiffs seeking to recover for injuries caused by over four 
decades of exposure to many asbestos products that were manufactured by many 
defendants. 568 A.2d at 1205. Asbestos cases, like Sholtis, often involve long disease 
dormancy periods, long exposure periods, numerous products, and numerous defendants. 
Id. Given all of these complications, establishing that any one defendant was a 
“substantial factor” in causing or exacerbating an asbestos plaintiff‟s illness using a 
traditional causation formulation proved a nearly insurmountable hurdle. In Sholtis, this 
difficulty was further exacerbated by the fact that 90-95% of the plaintiffs‟ cumulative 
exposure had been to a single defendant‟s products. Therefore, the Superior Court 
adopted an alternative formulation by which plaintiffs could establish medical causation, 
allowing them to show “an exposure of sufficient frequency, with a regularity of contact, 
and with the product in close proximity,” which was intended to lighten plaintiffs‟ 
burden. Id. at 1207 (citing Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1162-
63 (4th Cir. 1986)). This test, the Superior Court reasoned, struck “a fair balance between 
the needs of plaintiffs (recognizing the difficulty of proving contact) and defendants 
(protecting against liability predicated on guesswork).” Id.  
                                              
4
 Plaintiffs and Quad agree that they did not urge the District Court to apply this line of 
cases, and the District Court did so sua sponte.  
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In James, the New Jersey Supreme Court extended the application of the Sholtis 
test beyond asbestos cases. The plaintiff in James had been exposed to a “wide array of 
residues of petroleum products and other chemical substances, many allegedly containing 
. . . human carcinogens” during his 26 years of employment. 714 A.2d at 901. Like the 
Superior Court in Sholtis, the Court noted that toxic-tort plaintiffs often face 
“extraordinary and unique burdens” trying to prove causation. Id. at 909 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The Court observed that that problem “is further compounded 
where, as here, a plaintiff has been exposed to multiple products of multiple defendants 
over an extended period of time.” Id. The Court, therefore, held that “a plaintiff in an 
occupational-exposure, toxic-tort case may demonstrate medical causation by 
establishing: (1) factual proof of the plaintiff‟s frequent, regular and proximate exposure 
to a defendant‟s products; and (2) medical and/or scientific proof of a nexus between the 
exposure and the plaintiff‟s condition.” Id. at 911 (emphasis added).  
We do not believe that the Sholtis test applies to this case. Although this case bears 
some surface similarity to Sholtis and James in that it, too, is an occupational toxic-
exposure case, the complicated causation problems presented by those cases simply do 
not exist here. Most obviously, this case does not involve apportioning causation between 
many defendants who manufactured many different products, all of which contributed in 
some small way to Brian Steele‟s disease. Rather, this case involves only a single product 
and a single source. So if toluene caused Brian Steele‟s injury there is no difficulty in 
assigning causation to Quad. 
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Understood another way, Sholtis clearly focused on a different aspect of causation 
than is at issue here. In Sholtis it was clear that the plaintiffs‟ cumulative exposure to 
asbestos caused their injuries. The question was how, given their complex exposure 
history, the plaintiffs could prove that their exposure to any given defendant‟s product 
was a “substantial factor” in causing their disease. In this case, the question is whether 
Brian Steele‟s cumulative exposure to toluene was a substantial factor in causing his 
injury, not whether Quad‟s toluene was the cause. For that reason, the Sholtis test is 
inapposite.  
Finally, we reject Quad‟s assertion that Sholtis applies across the board in 
occupational-exposure, toxic-tort cases. None of the cases that Quad cites apply the 
Sholtis test to a single-product, single-defendant case. See Lewis v. Airco, Inc.,  
No. A3509-08T3, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1914 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 
15, 2011) (unpublished) (claiming workplace exposure to products of many defendants); 
Bass v. Air Prods. & Chems., No. A-4542-03T3, 2006 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2873 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 25, 2006) (unpublished) (involving a claim against 97 
different manufacturers for exposure to more than 400 different chemicals); Vassallo v. 
Am. Coding & Marking Ink Co., 784 A.2d 734 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (seeking 
damages where workplace exposure involved more than one product).  
On the other hand, in Webb v. Troy Corp., No. A-1944-05T3, 2007 N.J. Super. 
Unpub. LEXIS 633 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. April 12, 2007) (unpublished), the plaintiff 
was exposed to a chemical at work on a single occasion while power washing equipment 
leased from his employer by the defendant, a manufacturer of chemicals. In his suit for 
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negligence against the manufacturer, the Superior Court explained that “[t]he applicable 
burden of proof placed upon a plaintiff is to demonstrate exposure to a defendant‟s 
product and biological processes from the exposure which result in disease.” Id. at *24 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). It observed that “[t]he injuries here, unlike 
asbestos cases, which involve long-term exposure, come from a single exposure.” Id. 
Therefore, in such single-exposure cases, “expert opinion regarding „the dosage of 
exposure and mode of absorption‟ is relevant for a jury to consider, instead of the 
„frequency‟ or „regularity‟ of plaintiff‟s exposure.” Id. at *25 (emphasis added). While 
we are not bound by this unpublished decision of the Appellate Division of the Superior 
Court of New Jersey, we are persuaded by it. 
In sum, the District Court erred by applying the wrong legal standard. We will 
reverse the District Court‟s order granting summary judgment in favor of Quad on 
Counts II and IV and remand to the District Court for further proceedings on these 
Counts. 
III. 
 Plaintiffs‟ also urge that the District Court erred when it granted summary 
judgment in favor of Quad on their theory that Quad violated the One-Drop Rule by 
allowing towels containing more than one drop of liquid to be transported for cleaning.  
 As an initial matter, Plaintiffs argue that the District Court was incorrect to strike 
the July 19, 2011 affidavit of Brian Steele, which they allege supports this theory. As 
described above, the District Court concluded that the affidavit contained the new and 
materially different allegation that the drums Brian Steele transported contained 
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freestanding liquid toluene which would constitute a violation of the West Virginia Shop 
Towel Policy, and negligence per se. The District Court struck the affidavit as a sanction 
for Plaintiffs‟ failure to amend their interrogatories to include such allegations, as 
required by Rule 26.  
A court may exclude evidence where a party has failed to provide information as 
required by Rule 26 “unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 37(c)(1).  ”The exclusion of critical evidence is an extreme sanction, not normally 
to be imposed absent a showing of willful deception or flagrant disregard of a court order 
by the proponent of the evidence.” In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 791-92 
(3d Cir. 1994). Bearing in mind the advanced stage of the litigation, the extensive expert 
discovery that had already been completed, and Plaintiffs‟ lack of justification, we see no 
abuse of discretion in the District Court‟s choice of sanction here. Like the District Court 
we will not consider the July 19, 2011 affidavit in evaluating Plaintiffs‟ One-Drop theory. 
The District Court also properly excluded several pieces of evidence that Plaintiffs 
referred to only in their reply brief in support of their motion for reconsideration. This 
evidence was not before the District Court on the summary judgment motion and is not a 
proper basis for granting a motion to reconsider. The purpose of a motion for 
reconsideration is “to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered 
evidence.” Max’s Seafood Cafe v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1998). A proper 
motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) therefore must rely on one of three 
grounds: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new 
evidence; or (3) the need to correct clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice. N. 
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River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995). None of 
these apply here.  
 Ultimately, Plaintiffs‟ evidentiary support opposing the motion for summary 
judgment boils down to a single interrogatory answer describing the towels as solvent 
“soaked.” Given the evidence that toluene evaporates rapidly, the mere allegation that the 
towels were at one point “soaked” is not enough to raise a material dispute of fact as to 
whether the towels contained more than a single drop of solvent. We will affirm the 
District Court‟s grant of summary judgment in favor of Quad as to Plaintiffs‟ One-Drop 
theory.  
IV. 
Finally, both parties object to the District Court‟s orders respecting Plaintiffs‟ 
expert witnesses. For their part, Plaintiffs argue that it was error to exclude the opinions 
of Dr. Bates, an industrial hygienist expert, and Mr. Pina, an occupational safety expert, 
for lack of good grounds and a proper factual basis. Quad, on the other hand, urges error 
in the District Court‟s decision to permit the testimony of Plaintiffs‟ medical expert, Dr. 
Weeden, whom it argues did not perform a sufficiently reliable differential diagnosis. 
We review a district court‟s decision to admit or exclude expert testimony for 
abuse of discretion. General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142-43 (1997). Having 
carefully considered the appellate briefs of the parties, the parties‟ oral argument, and the 
record, including the memoranda of the District Court, we see no need to expand upon 
the District Court‟s opinions with respect to the expert testimony. The District Court‟s 
analysis was fulsome and well reasoned. Accordingly, for substantially the same reasons 
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set forth by the District Court, we will affirm the District Court‟s rulings as to Dr. Bates, 
Mr. Pina, and Dr. Weeden. 
V. 
For the reasons described above, we will affirm in part and reverse in part the 
District Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
